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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LCI ENTERPRISES, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ; 
vs. ; 
NORMAN R. CHESLER and SHAWN | 
DAVID NELSON, ] 
Defendants/Respondents. ; 
t Docket No. 
i Priority No. 
880146-CA 
14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court is authorized by Section 78-2-2(3)(i), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) to hear this appeal from the 
District Court because this Court does not have original 
jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended); however, by Order dated March 3, 1988, this case was 
"poured-over" to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court under Section 
78-2a-3(h). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final Order granting summary judgment 
of dismissal in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff entered 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
Plaintiff sought recovery for damage to real property caused by 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff/Appellant has raised the following issues on 
appeal: 
1. Whether any factual issues existed at the summary judgment 
proceeding to preclude the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
2. Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the lease 
agreement existing between Plaintiff LCI ENTERPRISES (hereinafter 
"LCI") and Theatre Candy Distributing Company. 
a. Whether the subrogation waiver provisions of the 
lease extended beyond the landlord and tenant to Defendants 
NORMAN R. CHESLER and SHAWN DAVID NELSON (hereinafter 
"CHESLER" and "NELSON"). 
b. Whether CHESLER is entitled to the benefits of the 
subrogation waiver agreement in view of the allegations of 
improper conduct which were raised in the original Complaint. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. Plaintiff instituted this action against 
Defendants on or about August 13, 1987 alleging that Defendants are 
liable for damage to Plaintiff's real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. Defendants moved the District 
Court for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's case. 
The motion was duly briefed and argued to the Court on November 2, 
1987. Judge Sawaya granted the motion in a minute entry dated 
November 25, 1987 and the formal Order dismissing Plaintifffs case 
was entered December 9, 1987. (Order. Record at 81, reproduced at 
A - 1). Plaintiff's appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment only. 
Defendants1 counsel argued to the District Court that if every 
allegation in the Plaintiff's Complaint was true — thus 
eliminating all issues of fact — Defendants were still entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law; therefore, appellate review 
of the summary judgment proceeding should focus on matters of law 
rather than issues of fact. For this reason, Defendants do not 
recite their version of the facts herein. 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the motion for summary judgment proceeding there were no 
issues of fact. Therefore, this Appellate Court should disregard 
all references to issues of fact in Plaintiff's Brief and limit its 
review to the rules of law which the District Court utilized in 
granting summary judgment. 
Any ambiguity which may be found in a landlord and tenant 
lease should be strictly construed against the landlord who 
furnished the lease and required the tenant to sign. 
The parties1 lease agreement contained a subrogation waiver 
clause which the District Court ruled to extend to the Defendants 
and, therefore, ruled that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants was 
thereby waived. The purpose of subrogation waivers is to help the 
parties avoid continuing dispute and litigation that is often the 
result of subrogation claims. 
The District Court's interpretation of the subrogation-waiver 
clause is correct and should be affirmed. In the lease, Plaintiff 
expressly "released" and "relieved" the employer and its 
"representatives" and Plaintiff "waived" its "entire claim" or 
"recovery for loss" arising out of a fire. 
Defendants were "representatives" of Theatre Candy Co. 
(tenant; and their employer) and, as such, were legal beneficiaries 
of the waiver agreement. 
4 
Defendants were intended third-party beneficiaries of the 
lease agreement; therefore, the leasehold rights owned by the 
tenant extend to Defendants. Plaintiff did not raise an issue in 
this regard on appeal. 
The subrogation waiver by Plaintiff was effective even if the 
fire was caused by the negligence of Theatre Candy Company's 
"agents or employees or otherwise." 
Plaintiff identifies "theories" in its Brief which were not 
presented to the lower court during the summary judgment 
proceeding. Consequently, on appeal the Plaintiff cannot utilize 
such new "theories" in an effort to show that the lower court 
erred. 
The District Court did not rewrite the subrogation-waiver 
clause or reform the lease as Plaintiff suggests. 
Defendant Nelson was an employee of Theatre Candy Distributing 
Company; although Plaintiff questions that on appeal, Plaintiff 
admitted it by means of allegations made in its Complaint, 
5 
ARGUMENT 
1. IN THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT. THEREFORE, THIS 
APPELLATE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD ALL REFERENCES 
TO ISSUES OF FACT IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF AND 
LIMIT ITS REVIEW TO THE RULES OF LAW WHICH THE 
DISTRICT COURT UTILIZED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
At the summary-judgment hearing, Defendants1 counsel admitted 
the truth of all allegations raised by Plaintiff in the pleadings 
(Transcript, p. 3, 1. 6-11). Such admission was made for the 
limited purpose of enabling the District Court to rule on the law 
applicable to the facts. 
Thus, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
the District Court was empowered to apply rules of law to such 
facts and grant summary judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that for the limited purpose of the 
summary-judgment motion the truth of Plaintiff's allegations was 
admitted by Defendants. In the same breath, however, Plaintiff 
refers to the existence of questions of fact which should preclude 
summary judgment. (Brief for Appellant at 16 & 17). 
Therefore, this Appellate Court should disregard all 
references to issues of fact in Plaintifffs Brief and limit its 
review to the rules of law which the District Court utilized in 
granting summary judgment. 
6 
2. ANY AMBIGUITY WHICH MAY BE FOUND IN A LANDLORD 
& TENANT LEASE SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE LANDLORD WHO FURNISHED THE LEASE 
AND REQUIRED THE TENANT TO SIGN. 
In a 1977 case strikingly similar to the present case, the 
Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case where a landlord sued his tenant 
alleging that the tenant negligently caused a fire on the leasehold 
premises. The tenant's motion for summary judgment was granted by 
the district court on the ground that the lease absolved the tenant 
from liability. Plaintiff appealed contending that summary 
judgment should not have been granted because of an alleged 
ambiguity in the lease. The Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court's summary-judgment dismissal reasoning that "any doubt or 
uncertainty in the language ... should be strictly construed 
against the landlord, who furnished the lease and required the 
tenant to sign." Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 
402, 403 (Utah 1977) (citing Cont. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee, 6 
Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773 (Utah 1957) and 1 Restatement of Contracts 
(Second), Sec. 236 (1982)). 
During the summary judgment proceeding, Defendant CHESLER'S 
affidavit (Record at 69, 70) stated that the lease was provided by 
Jay Liljenquist (i.e, of LCI ENTERPRISES) and that the subrogation 
waiver clause was standard in all of his leases; that fact was not 
controverted by Plaintiff in the summary judgment proceeding. 
7 
Thus, the lease provisions should be strictly construed against 
Plaintiff. 
3. THE PURPOSE OP SUBROGATION WAIVERS IS TO HELP 
THE PARTIES AVOID CONTINUING DISPUTE AND 
LITIGATION THAT IS OFTEN THE RESULT OF 
SUBROGATION CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff cites Henrv Shenk Co. v. City of Erie, 352 Pa. 481, 
43 A.2d 99 (1945) and Urich General Accident and Liability 
Insurance Company v. Klein, 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956), 
(Brief for Appellant at 15), for the proposition that waivers 
should be strictly construed so as to not bar Plaintiff's claim. 
However, it is well settled that where the terms of a release 
or waiver — and the facts and circumstances existing at the time 
of its execution — indicate the parties had in mind a general 
settlement of accounts, the release will be given effect according 
to its terms. In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1940) 
(citing Flaccus v. Wood, 260 Pa. 161, 167, 103 A. 549). Further, 
it was held in Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 430 F.Supp. 1265, 
1269 (E. D. Pa. 1977) that "If a release is to be lightly set aside 
for no other reason than the parties were mistaken as to the extent 
of the injuries, the effect of the release and the advantage of 
settlement would be lost." 
In the present case, both parties carried insurance and the 
insertion of the subrogation waiver in the lease enabled them, upon 
the occurrence of a damaging fire, to walk away from continuing 
disputes and litigation that is often result of insurance 
subrogation claims. 8 
As the subrogation-waiver clause in the present case states, 
the landlord and tenant waived their "entire claim or recovery" for 
"loss, damage, or injury" "arising out of or incident to fire". 
This language leaves nothing to the imagination; it is clear and 
concise. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OP THE 
SUBROGATION-WAIVER CLAUSE IS CORRECT AND SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
a. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM 
LIABILITY; PLAINTIFF'S LEASE WITH 
THEATRE CANDY CO. CONTAINED A WAIVER 
OF LIABILITY WHICH EXTENDED TO 
CHESLER AND NELSON. 
b. IN THE LEASE, PLAINTIFF EXPRESSLY 
"RELEASED" AND "RELIEVED" THEATRE 
CANDY CO. AND ITS "REPRESENTATIVES" 
AND "WAIVED" ITS "ENTIRE CLAIM" OR 
"RECOVERY FOR LOSS" ARISING OUT OF 
A FIRE. 
1) CHESLER AND NELSON WERE 
"REPRESENTATIVES" OF THE 
THEATRE CANDY CO. AND, AS 
SUCH, WERE LEGAL 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE 
WAIVER AGREEMENT. 
LCI leased commercial property to Theatre Candy Distributing 
Company. During the term of the lease, a fire occurred which 
destroyed portions of Theatre Candy's personal property and LCI's 
(landlord's) real-property improvements. (Brief for Appellant at 
3-4) . 
Plaintiff admitted in its Complaint that at the time of the 
fire, CHESLER was an officer and employee of Theatre Candy and 
NELSON was an employee. (Record at 2). 
9 
Plaintiff's action is a subrogation claim brought on behalf 
of Plaintiff's insurer against CHESLER and NELSON. 
CHESLER and NELSON are immune from liability because they are 
proper included and named beneficiaries of the subrogation-waiver 
clause contained in the LCI - Theatre Candy Co. lease which 
provides as follows: 
SUBROGATION WAIVER AGREEMENT 
17. The Lessor and Lessee do each hereby and 
herewith release and relieve the other, and waive their 
entire claim or recovery for loss, damage or injury 
arising out of or incident to fire, explosion or any 
other perils included in the extended coverage 
endorsement in, on or about the said premises, whether 
due to the negligence of any of said parties, their 
agents or employees or otherwise. It is mutually agreed 
that each of the covenants and agreements of this 
subrogation waiver agreement shall extend to and be 
binding upon the representatives, successors, heirs, 
administrators and assigns of the parties hereto. 
(Emphasis added). 
Addressing the elements of the foregoing provision: 
1. The waiver was expressly mutual with the landlord and 
tenant releasing and relieving the other. 
2. The landlord and tenant clearly waived "their entire 
claim or recovery for loss, damage or injury." 
3. The waiver specifically applied to "loss, damage or 
injury arising out of or incident to fire." 
4. The waiver was operative whether a fire was due to the 
negligence of a party or its agents or employees, or any 
other reason. 
10 
5. It was "mutually agreed" that each covenant and agreement 
of the "subrogation waiver agreement" was to "extend to 
and be binding upon" the "representatives" of the 
parties. 
6. The term "representative" is commonly and traditionally 
a broad and general term. Definitions of the term 
include: 
a. Representative includes an agent, an officer of a 
corporation or association, ... or any other person 
empowered to act for another. Utah Commercial Code, 
70A-1-201(35) (1953)1 (Emphasis added). 
1) Corporate Officer as Representative. By 
definition, "representative" includes "an 
officer of a corporation." A corporate officer 
is a "representative" of the corporation as 
that term is used in the Uniform Commercial 
Code art. 1, section 201(35). Rosedale State 
Bank & Trust Co., v. Stringer, 579 P.2d 159, 
161 (Kan.App. 1978). See Fitch v. Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 15 
(6th Cir. 1943). 
2) Employees as Representative. By definition, 
"representative" includes "an agent" or "any 
other person empowered to act for another." 
a) Agency. Relation in which one person acts 
for or represents another by latterfs 
authority, either in the relationship of 
principal and agent, master and servant, 
or employer or proprietor and independent 
contractor. Black's Law Dictionary 59 
(5th ed. 1979) (citing Gorton v. Doty, 57 
Idaho 792, 69 P.2d 136, 139 (1937) 
(Emphasis added)). 
Although the construction of the commercial lease in this 
case is not governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code, the 
quoted definition from the Commercial Code is indicative of the 
general and broad meaning of the term "representive." • 
11 
In Fitch v, Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. , 13 6 F.2d 12, 
15 (6th Cir. 1943), the term "representative" was found to include 
the President of a company who conducted business dealings for the 
company and, regardless of his conduct, he was also an "agent" of 
the company. Id. at 15. 
In Saums v. Parfet, 258 N.W. 235, 237 (Mich. 1935) , it was 
decided that an employee is often found to be the "agent and hence 
the * representative'" of his employer. 
Now, with respect to the definitions of "representative" 
contained in Plaintiff's Brief, Defendants respond as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff's reference to Jackson v. Tibbits, 9 Cow. 
241 (N.Y. 1828), (Brief for Appellant at 14), does not 
support a conclusion that "representatives" means "heirs 
or executors." Rather, Jackson states that 
"* representatives' has no technical meaning in the law." 
In other words, "representatives" is a broad and 
generally-inclusive term rather than a specific term. 
Jackson then generally discusses a few of the terms which 
are included within the term "representatives." However, 
the conclusion of Jackson is that "[representative] never 
signifies a grantee." Id. at 251. Inasmuch as the 
present case does not involve the relationship between 
"representative" and "grantee" the rule of law for which 
Jackson stands is not applicable to the present case and 
Plaintiff's citing that case is not appropriate. 
12 
The Plaintiff's reference to Zvch v. Zvch, 183 Neb. 708, 
163 N.W.2d 882 (1969), (Brief for Appellant at 14), does 
not support a conclusion that the term "representatives" 
excludes the more specific terms "employees" or 
"corporate officers." Rather, Zych simply states that 
* representatives' "includefs]" (emphasis added) persons 
succeeding to the rights of a decedent. Zych does not 
say that "representatives" excludes "employees" or 
"corporate officers." Id. at 885. The rule of law in 
Zych recognizes the inclusion of certain words within the 
meaning of "represenatives" but it does not attempt to 
say that those are the only words that qualify for 
inclusion and it does not attempt to identify words which 
are excluded. Therefore, following a reading of the Zych 
case one can still properly conclude that "officers" and 
"employees" fit within the broad and general term 
"representatives." 
Plaintiff next cites Husers v. Papania, 22 So.2d 755 
(La.Ct.App. 1945), (Brief for Appellant at 14), for the 
proposition that "representative," when used in a phrase 
with "successor," means someone like a "receiver, 
liquidator, executor, administrator, guardian or tutor." 
Husers at 757. Interestingly, the rules of law set forth 
in Husers are dependent upon the narrow factual situation 
that was involved — the Louisiana Court of Appeal was 
considering whether criminal provisions of the Emergency 
13 
Price Control Act of 1942 extended beyond the seller of 
goods to the seller's agent• The regulated price of used 
refrigerators was $12. Defendant sold her son's 
refreigerator to Plaintiff for $210. Defendant (son's 
mother) claimed Plaintiff had no cause of action because 
she was acting as the agent of the owner (her son) and 
carrying out his instructions. The applicable statutue 
extended over-charge liability to persons including 
* individual, corporation, partnership, association, or 
any other organized group of persons, or legal successor 
or representative of the foregoing.1 Id. at 757. The 
Court narrowly construed the word "representative" and 
tied its meaning to "legal successor" and refused to 
extend the meaning to include agents and noted that a 
penal statute "should be strictly construed" because 
"liability cannot be established or extended by 
implication." Id. at 757-758. However, the rule in 
Husers is not to say that courts are powerless to make 
implications; to the contrary, because courts are so 
frequently called upon to interpret, infer and imply, 
sundry rules of construction and interpretation have been 
developed to those ends. See Langer v. Iowa Beef 
Packers, Inc.. 420 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1970); Restatement 
of Contracts, Sec. 226. Further, the court in Husers was 
restrained by the fact that it did not want to extend 
criminal liability to a seemingly innocent mother and so 
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the court opted for the narrowest reading of the statute 
it could possibly make. 
4. Plaintiff cites Briggs v. Walker, 171 U.S. 466 (1898), 
(Brief for Appellant at 14) , to conclude that 
"representatives" means "executors or administrators." 
However, the terminology in Briggs which was in issue was 
more specific and limited than "representatives;11 the 
question concerned the meaning of "legal 
representatives." Briggs at 471 (emphasis added). 
Briggs did not state that "representatives" only means 
"executors or administrators;" it merely said that those 
are two of the meanings within the more general term. 
Again, as in Zych v. Zych supra, the rule of law in 
Briggs focuses on inclusion rather than on exclusion. 
Also, it should be observed that Briggs was decided in 
1898 at a time when the American economy was primarily 
agrarian and the existence of employment relationships 
amid the populace was limited; the idea of a man 
representing another was more limited than it is today. 
Since that time, much litigation and development in the 
law has involved the relationship between employers and 
employees and the representational relationship between 
the two. Therefore, ninety years after Briggs, it is 
more likely for persons to include in their contracts the 
general term "representative" and to have that term 
include the more specific terms "employee" or "officer." 
15 
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A word, such as "representative," is a collection of meanings 
just like a picture is an image of meanings. By concluding, as 
Plaintiff does, that "representative" means "executors or 
administrators" (Brief of Appellant at 14-15) Plaintiff is covering 
up a large part of the picture. "Representative" is a very broad 
and a very general term that includes many meanings and for it to 
take on a specific meaning it must be joined to words of 
limitation. For example, the more limited term "personal 
represenative" means "an executor or administrator of a person 
deceased." Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund v. Hamilton, 2 59 
A.2d 303, 306 (Md. 1969). See, 2 Bouv Law Diet. 1911, Rawlefs 
Third Revision. 
5. DEFENDANTS CHESLER AND NELSON WERE INTENDED 
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES OP THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE LEASEHOLD RIGHTS 
OWNED BY THE TENANT EXTEND TO CHESLER AND 
NELSON. 
Plaintiff has not raised an issue, on appeal, with respect to 
Defendants1 argument to the lower court (Record at 75-76) that 
Defendants CHESLER and NELSON were, at law, third-party 
beneficiaries of the landlord-tenant lease agreement; therefore, 
that theory of the case should be upheld in Defendants1 favor. 
6. THE SUBROGATION WAIVER BY LANDLORD WAS 
EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE FIRE WAS CAUSED BY THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF THEATRE CANDY COMPANY•S "AGENTS 
OR EMPLOYEES OR OTHERWISE." 
Plaintiff argues in its "POINT I (C)" and "POINT II" (Brief 
for Appellant at 15-17) that the District Court interpreted the 
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subrogation-waiver clause too broadly in that it sheltered CHESLER 
from the commission of acts which were more than negligent. 
Plaintiff states that CHESLER1S actions were grossly negligent or 
that they evidenced a disregard for the safety of Plaintifffs 
premises. 
Again, for the limited purpose of the summary proceeding all 
facts alleged by Plaintiff were admitted so that the District Court 
could bypass any issues-of-fact determination and proceed directly 
to a determination of the governing law. 
The District Court ruled that the subrogation-waiver clause 
precluded all of the Plaintiff's claims — including the claims 
referred to immediately above. The waiver clause clearly manifests 
the parties1 intent in that it states that the landlord and tenant 
waive "their entire claim or recovery for loss ... whether due to 
... negligence ... or otherwise." (See Lease Agreement, par. 17, 
supra). 
• » • 
7. THE PLAINTIFF IDENTIFIES "THEORIES" IN ITS 
BRIEF WHICH WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE LOWER 
COURT DURING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING. 
CONSEQUENTLY, ON APPEAL THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT 
UTILIZE SUCH NEW "THEORIES" IN AN EFFORT TO 
SHOW THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED. 
Appellate courts are courts of review; they review the 
proceedings of the lower court; review does not include matters 
raised on appeal which were not presented at the lower court. 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services. 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. 
App. September 27, 1988); Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n. 755 P.2d 166, 
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168 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
This Court has ruled that "[o]rdinarily an appellant cannot 
change his theory of the case on appeal from that presented to the 
court below." Davis v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970). In 
that case, Davis sought to recover money he had paid for an option 
to buy land. In support of his request for rescission, his theory 
or reason at trial was "mutual" mistake; on appeal he added a new 
reason — i.e., "unilateral" mistake. The Supreme Court seemed to 
disapprove of that tactic concluding that even if Davis had 
presented the "unilateral-mistake" theory at trial he could not 
have prevailed. Id. 
In Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970) 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the reason the above-stated rule 
is followed in Utah is to maintain orderly procedure in the courts 
with the ultimate purpose being the final settlement of 
controversies. The Court reasoned that a party must present his 
entire case and theory to the trial court, and, having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus "attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation." id. at 401. 
See also First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State 
University, 544 P.2d 887, 892 (Utah 1975). 
The above-stated Utah rule applies to the present case as 
follows. 
At the lower court, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment (Record at 40-45) stated 2 relatively short and 
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general reasons why its case should not be dismissed; the 2 
arguments are summarized under the following 2 headings: 
1. CLEAR LANGUAGE, That the language of the lease was clear 
and the lease included no language that could be construed as 
meaning that the lessor waived any claim as against Defendants 
CHESLER and NELSON (Record at 43). 
Plaintiff failed to make any mention at all concerning 
Defendants1 interpretation of the word "representative" 
or their argument that such general term, by definition, 
included the more specific terms "officer" and/or 
"employee." 
PRESENT APPEAL. On appeal, Plaintiff changes its 
approach as follows: 
1) Plaintiff now argues, for the first time, that 
the definition of "representative" should come 
from its context and should mean "successor in 
interest" and/or "executors or administrators" 
rather than "employees." (Brief for Appellant 
at 10-13). 
2) Plaintiff now argues, for the first time, that, 
as a matter of law, a waiver clause should not 
bar a claim which had not accrued as of the 
date of the lease (Brief for Appellant at 15-
16) . 
3) Plaintiff now argues, for the first time, that 
application of the waiver to include officers 
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and/or employees of the lessee exceeds the 
contemplation and/or intent of the parties. 
(Brief for Appellant at 13-15). 
2. BREACH, That the lessee (Theatre Candy Distributing Co.) 
breached the lease in not maintaining property damage 
insurance to protect the lessor (Plaintiff) and that such 
breach precludes Defendants from benefitting from the 
subrogation-waiver clause (Record at 43). 
PRESENT APPEAL, On appeal, Plaintiff abandons that 
theory. 
8. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant in its "POINT III" cites three authorities2 in 
support of a proposition that summary judgment is a drastic remedy 
to be utilized only where there exists no genuine issue of material 
fact. Plaintiff argues from these three cases that the District 
Court should resolve uncertainties concerning issues of fact in a 
light favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Brief for 
Appellant at 19). 
Defendants contend that motions for summary judgment should 
be granted when the material facts in a case are not in dispute and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
* Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Spor v. 
Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 ([sic] 1987). 
Briaham Truck and Implement Company v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 
1987). 
20 
Summary judgment eliminates "the time, trouble and expense of trial 
when it is clear as a matter of law that the [parties] ruled 
against [are] not entitled to prevail." Amiacs Interwest Inc. v. 
Devyn Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court 
has also stated: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, the lower court was not called upon to 
decide whether there were any issues of fact; for the limited 
purpose of the summary-judgment proceeding, counsel for Defendant 
CHESLER argued to the District Court (Transcript at 3) that even 
if every allegation raised in the Plaintiff's pleadings was true, 
Plaintiff's claim must still fail as a matter of law. 
9. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT REWRITE THE 
SUBROGATION-WAIVER CLAUSE OR REFORM THE LEASE. 
Appellant in its "POINT I" (Brief for Appellant at 8-9) and 
"POINT III" (Brief for Appellant at 18-19) argues that the District 
Court rewrote the subrogation-waiver clause and reformed the 
contract when in the minute entry Judge Sawaya wrote "the Lessor 
and Lessee do each hereby and herewith release and relieve the 
other and their respective employees . . . ." 
Judge Sawaya was stating his interpretation of the contract 
as a matter of law. In a summary judgment proceeding, it is 
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essential that the trial court indicate, as a matter of law, how 
the contract language applies to the undisputed facts. 
10. THE INTENT OP THE LANDLORD AND TENANT WAS 
MANIFEST IN THE LEASE DOCUMENT. 
Appellant in its "POINT III" argues that at the summary 
judgment hearing "the trial court had no evidence whatsoever of the 
parties1 intent," (Brief for Appellant at 19). 
To the contrary, the trial court had before it in clear and 
unambiguous terms the clear intent of both parties as they 
expressed it in paragraph 9 of the lease (i.e., the landlord agreed 
to insure the leased building and premises against fire) and in 
paragraph 17 (i.e., the subrogation-waiver clause). 
Also, as to the issue of intent in subrogation cases involving 
landlord-tenant relationships, a clear and definite line of cases 
has held that the tenant is not liable for damages caused, even by 
his own negligence. The rationale for these decisions is that the 
landlord's insurance on the premises is presumed to insure the 
tenant also. See Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, 623 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Alaska 1981); Rock Springs 
Realty, Inc. v. Waid. 392 S.W.2d 270 at 277 (Mo. 1965); R. Keeton, 
Insurance Law. 4.4(b) at 210 (1971). 
Other courts have noted that such insurance is purchased for 
both parties1 benefit. Fry v. Jordan Auto Co., 224 Miss. 445, 80 
So.2d 53, 58 (1955); Monsanto Chemical Co. v. American Bitumuls 
Co., 249 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); see generally M. Friedman, 
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"Landlords, Tenants and Fires—Insurer's Right of Subrogation," 43 
Cornell L.Q. 225, 228 & n. 12 (1957). 
More recent cases have developed the theory, in holding 
tenants harmless for landlord's damages, that by paying rent the 
has paid for his possible negligence in advance — the rent being 
set at an amount sufficient to cover the landlord's fire insurance 
expenditures. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Auto Spring 
Supply Co.. 59 Cal. App. 3d 860, 131 Cal.Rptr. 211, 214-15 
(Cal.Ct.App. 1976); Rock Springs Realty, infra; Sutton v. Jondahl, 
532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla.App. 1975). 
In addition, courts have noted that permitting a subrogation 
action against a tenant would give insurers a windfall since fire 
insurers expect to pay fire losses for fires and their rates are 
calculated upon that basis. Rock Springs Realty, infra; Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , infra; Million, "Real and Personal 
Property," 33 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 552, 586 (1958). 
11. DEFENDANT NELSON WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THEATRE 
CANDY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY; ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF 
QUESTIONS THAT ON APPEAL, PLAINTIFF ADMITTED 
IT BY MEANS OF ITS COMPLAINT. 
In "POINT III" of its Brief, Plaintiff contends that Defendant 
Nelson may not have been an employee of Theatre Candy Distributing 
Co. and, thereby, not entitled to the protection of the 
subrogation-waiver clause in the lease. (Brief for Appellant at 
19). 
It is improper for Plaintiff to point to Defendant NELSON'S 
employment status on appeal because in its Complaint Plaintiff 
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alleged that NELSON was an employee (Record at 2) and in his Answer 
to the Complaint Defendant CHESLER (Record at 14) admitted that 
NELSON was an employee. Further, Plaintiff admitted in its 
Docketing Statement on file herein that NELSON was an employee. 
(Docketing Statement at 2). 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court ruling was correct and for the foregoing 
reasons the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims should be upheld 
and costs and attorney fees awarded to Defendants pursuant to the 
contractual provisions of the lease agreement. 
DATED this Kg day of October, 1988. 
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DEC 10 1937 
Randall J. Holmgren, #4054 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
The Valley Bank Tower, Ninth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
LCI ENTERPRISES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORMAN R. CHESLER and SHAWN 
DAVID NELSON 
Defendants. ] 
' ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. C 87 5420 
1 Judge: Sawaya 
In the above-entitled action, Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment requesting that Plaintifffs claims be dismissed 
with prejudice. Defendants filed memoranda and affidavits in 
support of the motion and Plaintiff filed memoranda and 
affidavits in opposition. 
The matter was heard by the Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, on 
Monday, November 2, 1987. Plaintiff was represented at the 
hearing by Marcella Keck, Esq. and Defendants were represented by 
Randall J. Holmgren, Esq. and Robert D. Dahle, Esq. 
000031 
Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and affidavits on 
file and having heard the arguments of counsel/ and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED/ ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Defendants and each of them are entitled to the 
benefits of the subrogation-waiver agreement as contained within 
the written lease agreement existing between LCI Enterprises and 
Theatre Candy Distributing Co. 
2. That based upon said subrogation-waiver agreement/ 
Defendants are not liable to Plaintiff for damages, or otherwise, 
arising out of the fire which is alleged in the Plaintifffs 
Complaint. 
3. That Defendants are not liable for any of the claims 
:ontained in the Plaintifffs Complaint. 
4. That Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
5. That Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
>: < ^ ? . Date: O / , 1987. 
Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DJXON MiNDLEY 
Cfe* 
b<y^\>^KnJ?^A,fi/ 
/ pepuiy C!erk 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to the following, 
postage prepaid, five (5) days before submitting the same to the 
Court for its signature, in accordance with Rule 2.9 of the Rules 
of Practice. 
John D. Parken, Esq. 
Marcella Keck, Esq. 
Parken & Keck 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert D. Dahle, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Nelson 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 106 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
DATE: November 30, 1987. 
^ u ( k / > 
Randall J. Holmgren 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed four 
) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
the following, postage prepaid. 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
PARKEN & KECK 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Date: October ^-^ , 1988. 6 
Randall J. Holmgren 
